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Towards a Critical Concept of the Statesperson 
Richard Beardsworth Aberystwyth University∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers convergence between classical realism and critical theory in relation 
to pressing political problems. It argues that the spirit of both traditions can help develop 
critical reflection on the state as an agent of change. I suggest that too much recent 
critical theorization has avoided the state in its attention to social movements, but that a 
critical concept of state leadership is now required to address global threats and 
challenges. The paper rehearses this critical concept in three stages. It considers, first, 
how the concept of national interest drives statecraft in the authorship of Hans 
Morgenthau and how complex this concept is both in its own terms and with regard to the 
political effects of the nuclear revolution. It develops, second, a multi-layered concept of 
responsibility as the guiding concept of statecraft in a world of increasingly incompatible 
demands. It argues, third, that these concepts of national interest and responsibility need 
to be aligned with global imperatives so that a greater marriage between the global and 
the national is possible. I conclude that it is the task of contemporary critical thought to 
address this present through a reimagined political realism. 
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Introduction: the present of theory 
One important meeting-place between classical realism and critical theory from the 
perspective of modernity, crisis, and humanity is an understanding of the present and of 
political responses to it. Both trivial and non-trivial, the point requires explanation in 
order that the guiding concept of this paper, a critical concept of the statesperson, is 
appropriately understood.1 
 That classical realism and critical theory meet in an understanding of, and 
political response to, the present may seem perplexing, particularly to those studying 
international relations through the lens of critical theory or to those in classical realism 
that have recently emphasized its more meta-theoretical credentials.2 Indeed one might 
precisely argue that where classical realism and critical theory meet is in a particular 
distance to the present. This distance affords a critical approach to dominant modes of 																																																								
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thought and behaviour, one lost if ‘truth’ comes too close to ‘power’ and loses extra-
systemic leverage on structures of domination. This judgment is intellectually pertinent, 
informing part of the critical gesture behind the recent retrieval of classical realism from 
the IR schools of structural realism and neorealism. That said, I consider it equally 
critical to re-emphasize the importance of the present in both classical realism and critical 
theory given contemporary need for political imagination. 
 For the classical realists of the 1940s and 1950s (in particular, E.H. Carr, John 
Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Arnold Wolfers), theoretical reflection 
always stemmed from, and was rooted in, a practical context. Reflection on the tenets of 
political realism, on national interest and power dynamics and on the security dilemma 
and nuclear weaponry were made in the immediate context of what was interpreted to be 
contemporary international reality: the failure of liberal internationalism, a system of 
states, and an ideologically polarized world of nations. The ‘classical realism’ of this 
period constitutes a family set (in the Wittgensteinian sense) of theoretical responses to 
this international predicament. The political morality of prudent statecraft, with which 
this set is closely identified, constitutes, in turn, the practically oriented theoretical 
outcome of these responses (Brown, 2012; Lang, 2004; Molloy, 2009; Williams, 2005). 
In these two respects—without being either presentist or subservient to present political 
actors or power structures—classical realism is a theory of, and for, the present. 
 As for critical theory, the temporal modality of its disposition towards political 
reality is more complex, but also oriented towards the present. In “Traditional and 
Critical Theory’ Max Horkheimer makes four claims for critical theory (Horkheimer, 
1937). First, in distinction to positivism, it is comprehensive in its understanding of social 
processes (hence the Frankfurt School’s debt to critical political economy on the 
determining contradictions of capitalism). Second, in distinction to both abstract theory 
and the theorizing of successive periods of history, it works ‘with time’ (233) in the sense 
that it is both aware of its historical conditions and aware of its temporal relation to the 
historical practices of contemporary society. Third, as practical theory, it considers itself 
‘an element in action leading to new social forms’, as a ‘force stimulating social change’ 
(215-6). Fourth, in distinction to the policy dimension of positivist theory and science, 
this practical nature is geared to the normative end of emancipation: a society of peoples 
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free from domination (230-1).  In sum, in comparison with previous conceptions of 
theory, Horkheimer defines ‘critical’ theory as comprehensive, historical, practical and 
normative. Critical theorizing entails, accordingly, addressing present societal problems 
in such as way as not to repeat the present, but open it up to the future, to seek, that is, the 
present’s normative ‘transformation’. While rightly refusing a political agent of historical 
transformation, critical theory’s theoretical and practical force regarding the present has, 
however, become increasingly dissipated for internal and external reasons. Externally, the 
functional speed and social complexity of modernizing processes has undermined the 
‘comprehensive’ nature of critical theory and marginalized it in political debate. 
Internally, when this non-comprehensive and marginal fate of critical theorizing has been 
consciously assumed (as with poststructuralist theory from the 1980s onwards), critical 
theory has often abandoned the public sphere to other forces (Beardsworth, 2011: 199-
226). The contemporary poverty of post-Cold War liberalism (including its present 
structural inability to deal with nationalism) has been one consequence of critiquing 
political debate from the social and cultural margins, rather than deepening it, 
comprehensively, at its political and economic center.3 As a form of historical theorizing, 
critical theory should, I believe, return to an understanding of itself as ‘transformative’ of 
the present. Given this understanding of critical theorizing I consider that it is in the 
temporal dimension of the present and in this present’s problems that these two different 
bodies of contemporary international theory meet. 
 What, then, is the present of international politics? What are the problems of 
international politics that organize its present and to which morally informed theory 
responds? There is always room for subjective arbitrariness in an answer to this question, 
one predicated on the prejudices or preferences of the observer. That said, there is a 
cluster of problems that insist at the international level because they prove resistant to 
solution and because they have thrown up many unanswered conceptual and practical 
questions. These problems are what are called ‘global threats and challenges’.4 To 
differing extents, they affect in fact or in principle all peoples of the world: nuclear 
armament, climate change and its effects (new migration patterns, food and water 
sustainability, etc.), terrorism, health pandemics, and poverty and increasing inequality. 
Of a global dimension or with global effect, these problems define the present less 
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because they are of the present than because, remaining intractable within the present 
international political order, they insist as the present. It is evident that solutions to these 
problems require effective cooperation between states. What is not evident is how to 
engineer that cooperation or how to present stepping-stones to a different political order 
that would mitigate the need for inter-state cooperation in the first place. In the so-called 
‘gap’ between global problems and political solutions to them (what is presently called 
‘global governance failure’ (Goldin, 2013), ‘deadlock’ (Victor, 2011), or ‘gridlock’ (Hale 
et al., 2013) two things are therefore clear. First, there is a lack of political solutions to 
global problems; second, there is a lack of critical theoretical reflection that would help 
foster these political solutions.5 
 In this present how do the two international theories of classical realism and 
critical theory meet and help? Since these global problems pose critical questions 
regarding the survival and/or welfare of humanity within modernizing processes, answers 
to this question are more than important, necessarily resonating with the larger themes of 
this special issue on modernity and crisis. To kick-start my argument, I suggest among 
others, and somewhat straightforwardly, that, rather than looking to solutions to global 
problems in global terms and at a global level (as has been the habit of international 
liberalism since the end of the Cold War), theorists confront the crisis of global 
governance in national terms and from the national level upwards. As Ian Goldin 
succinctly puts it, solutions to global problems must begin with the nation-state and with 
the preferences of state leaders (Goldin, 2013: 54). In more theoretical terms, in a world 
order still structured by the independence of states—however interdependent this world 
has at the same time become—the state must be considered not the obstacle, but the very 
means to effective and legitimate global governance arrangements.  One consequence of 
this hypothesis is that theories of the progressive state and of progressive state leadership 
are needed that both assume the limits of political action in a complex world and align 
global imperatives with national interests. Therefore, in the context of this global present, 
one effective meeting-place between classical realism and critical theory is to develop a 
critical concept of the statesperson that promotes progressive state leadership. Rather 
than back-tracking, stalling, deferring, or scapegoating others in order to make his or her 
choices, this statesperson would embody the multiple responsibilities of the state in a 
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globalized world where duties to one’s own people, duties to foreigners, and duties to 
species life and the planet are assumed as conflicting and/or are aligned as compatible 
(both practices being part of political ethics).6 
 This paper follows one particular path towards the conception of this statesperson.  
I do not consider it a privileged path. Historical studies, intellectual history and a diverse 
set of leadership studies do the important graft on statecraft; indeed, ultimately, a trans-
disciplinary research project on global state leadership is required to uncover this 
conception. It is a path however—and this is the particularity of my paper—that attempts 
to align critical reflection not only with contemporary needs, but also with a political 
agency, state conduct, that has most often been condemned or circumvented in self-
consciously ‘critical’ literature as, precisely, ‘uncritical’ (whether this conception of the 
state be one of self-interest, power, imperialism, or particularism). In this vein, in order to 
give its critique of the contemporary global order, critical reflection of the last twenty-
five years has turned theoretical attention away from the state and focused on global civil 
society, post-national politics, and/or cosmopolitan orders (Archibugi and Held, 1995; 
Habermas, 1996; Hayden, 2005; Scholte, 2011; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999). Here lies 
the interest of the meeting-place between state-minded classical realism and critical 
theory.7 
 My argument is made in five stages.  Section one tracks the evolution of the 
concept of ‘national interest’ among classical realists like Hans Morgenthau and 
Reinhold Niebuhr, pinpoints how the concept is erased under conditions of modern 
technology and appraises the conceptions of prudence and self-restraint that emerge 
therefrom. The failure to align national interest with global imperatives restricts classical 
realist formulations of statecraft in a globalized world. Section two looks at three recent 
critically minded attempts to reconsider classical realism with regard to global reform to 
see if a deeper concept of state leadership is on offer. With mixed results, Part three then 
turns to recent work of the English School theorist, Robert Jackson, that explicitly founds 
the concept of prudence and statecraft on the practice of responsibility in order to see if 
the dilemmas of classical realism can be better rehearsed. I argue that they can as long as 
an historical sociology accompanies Jackson’s work on state responsibility. However, as 
a result of this approach, contra Jackson’s theoretical modesty, Part four seeks to align 
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global with national interests in order to secure a transformative notion of contemporary 
state leadership that works towards emancipation. Part five then rehearses the traits of the 
critical notion of statesperson that has emerged through the preceding course of 
arguments. The conclusion returns to my reformist understanding of the ‘critical’ and 
‘critical theorization’ when seeking this notion in response to present global problems. 
  
I: The statesperson and national interest in classical realism 
For classical realists like E.H. Carr (2001), John Herz (1959), George Kennan (1984), 
Hans Morgenthau (1952a; 1952b; 1954; 1971) and Reinhold Niebuhr (2002; 2008), 
foreign policy and international diplomacy is made intelligible through reference to the 
concept of ‘national interest’. It is a commonplace of IR theory that, by defining foreign 
policy in these terms, the mid-twentieth century classical realists were attacking liberal 
internationalism and, at the same time, laying the conceptual groundwork for the 
emergent discipline of IR. Due to their re-interpretation over the last decade, it is also a 
commonplace that the notion of national interest is less a functional than a relational and 
moral concept (Bacevich, 2008; Bell, 2008; Cozette, 2008; Lebow, 2001; Scheuerman, 
2009, 2011; Schou Tjalve, 2008; T. Smith, 2010; Williams, 2005). From this perspective, 
the emphasis of classical realist thought on political morality was lost with the rise of 
behaviorist and systemic thought during the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this section 
is not to enter this recent debate (which, after an effective decade, is basically won), but 
to deduce from classical realism’s rehearsal of national interest its understanding of the 
statesperson and to show how and where this understanding remains limited, but 
paradigmatically useful for reflection on state leadership in a globalized world. It is Hans 
Morgenthau’s work that is theoretically and institutionally most assertive regarding the 
link between foreign policy and national interest; I will keep, therefore, to his illustrative 
pronouncements. 
 During the ‘Great Debate’ of the first half of the 1950s, Morgenthau argues in an 
assertive relay of publications how American foreign policy can only be made intelligible 
through the concept of ‘national interest’ (Morgenthau, 1952a; 1952b; 1952c; 1954; 
1971). His basic point is that the political action of state leaders must be guided by this 
concept rather than by normative frameworks of international law because, otherwise, the 
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state is left, in principle if not in fact, exposed to the military and economic forces of 
other states. National interest constitutes nevertheless a much more layered concept in 
Morgenthau’s writings than in later realist work that focuses on the explanatory nature of 
material power. There are at least five dimensions of national interest that guide statecraft 
for Morgenthau; it is worth rehearsing them in ascending order of complexity (compare, 
in particular, Williams, 2005: 180-92). 
First, the concept of national interest refers to the ‘vital interests’ of the country: 
what maintains the country’s territorial existence, secures the biological survival of its 
population, but also guarantees its immediate self-understanding. These interests are 
military and economic, but they also involve what is worth ‘defending with one’s life’ 
(Morgenthau, 1952a: 970). The statesperson is the one who protects the nation in these 
terms, and it is this concept of statecraft that citizens of nation-states are still most 
familiar with when the concepts of ‘national interest’ and ‘national security’ are wielded 
in the public realm. Second, as the above notion of national sacrifice already presupposes, 
national interest concerns political and cultural identity. It is a duty of state leadership to 
defend the moral and political values of the nation (whatever national history, sectional 
interests or basic consensus have decided the tenor of these values). Third, to defend 
these interests must be done in such a way that this defense is compatible with, indeed 
includes, the interests of other nations, and vice versa (Morgenthau, 1952a: 978, 985-7).8 
This third conception of national interest foregrounds the political morality of statecraft. 
Balancing one’s own national interests with others constitutes an act of tolerance in the 
international environment. This tolerance maintains international order: that is, the 
promotion of the national interest of a group of nations. This third sense of national 
interest leads to its fourth definition as ‘international responsibility’. If, for Morgenthau, 
‘statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power’, Morgenthau, 1960a: 5), 
national interest as tolerance entails the responsibility of power towards world order. 
National interest is not, in other words, geared to the sovereign right of power except in 
conditions of immediate national survival (layer one). Rather, as a relational practice of 
power/interest with regard to other powers and interests, the idea and practice of the 
national interest connote responsibilities towards others’ interests and towards world 
order. Hence why, for Morgenthau, the more power a nation holds, the more related it is 
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to other political entities than itself, and therefore, the more responsibilities it bears. For 
classical realism, ‘great power’ entails ‘great responsibility’ in this sense (Claude, 1986; 
compare Bukovansky et al., 2012). Just as rights and responsibilities are inseparable in 
the liberal polity, so power and responsibility are inextricable in the international system 
of states. Despite its critique of liberal rationalism the classical realist notion of interest as 
responsibility is, accordingly, profoundly liberal (see Williams, 2005). 
Now, this complex of understandings of national interest come together in the 
political morality and morally informed political choices of the statesperson, the driver of 
a nation’s foreign policy. Assertion of one’s national interests should not override the 
interests of other nations unless the integrity of any one national interest constitutes 
irresponsibility towards the least violent conduct of world politics. International tolerance 
is constitutively limited, for instance, by intolerance towards nationalist aggression. For 
Morgenthau, appeasement towards Hitler was bad statecraft (Morgenthau, 1954); but so, 
inversely, was the American conflation of Russian imperialism with Asian communism 
and the consequent US intervention in the Korean War. The intervention constituted, as 
with the succeeding Vietnam War, intolerance towards what was judged a national 
movement of self-determination (Morgenthau 1954, 1960b). In a pluralist world of 
nation-states, the exercise of national self-restraint and the negotiation of interests 
towards the common good of international order constitute the major political virtues of 
the statesperson. 
In sum, if the concept of national interest is, for Morgenthau, to guide foreign 
policy, all foreign policy converges on a political morality of prudence in three senses. 
The statesperson acts prudently first, by protecting his or her peoples from existential 
threats; second, by limiting violence between international political entities—in Burkean 
terms, ‘the law of neighborhood’ and ‘the rules of prudence’ (Burke, 2011); third, by 
leading responsibly in the international environment through the example of national 
interest and its conduct, not by a universalist conception of this interest’s general 
applicability (Morgenthau, 1960b: 34). These three points are well known to 
contemporary students of IR due both to the recent revival of classical realism and to the 
fact that effective criticism of neoconservative American foreign policy from 2001 to 
2006 was often conducted in the classical realist terms of self-restraint (Bacevich, 2008; 
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Smith, 2010; Williams, 2005, 2007). Indeed, the revival of classical realism and 
criticisms of G.W. Bush’s state leadership in the world are not unrelated. Bush’s piloting 
of international crusades, in the name of freedom, smacked of political moralism, not 
political morality; it was therefore an important intellectual exercise to resurrect classical 
realism for theoretical and practical purposes (Beardsworth, 2011: 75-110). 
 However, the contemporary interest of classical realism lies not only in the above 
conceptions of prudent statecraft, but also in the telling failure of the mid-twentieth 
century realists to deal conceptually with the relation between national interest and 
modern technology. Morgenthau is again most illustrative here because his writings from 
the late 1950s argue that modern technology (the fact of nuclear weaponry) puts in 
question the very concept of national interest that he seeks at the same time to defend 
contra liberal rationalism. Tracing this dilemma of national interest leaves an un-thought 
in classical realist considerations of statecraft that has only recently begun to be 
developed in critical terms. Regarding the meeting-place of classical realism and critical 
theory in the present, this technopolitical ‘unthought’ needs rehearsal and response. 
National and supranational interests are, for Morgenthau, incompatible. ‘The 
nations of the world must overcome the dilemma that the pursuit of their interests, 
conceived in national terms, is incompatible with modern technology, which requires 
supranational political organization’ (Morgenthau, 1971 [1958]: 219). National interest 
must yield to the supranational ‘in the national interest of all nations’ (219). If the 
dilemma of technological modernity gives rise to the paradox that national interest must 
be ceded in the name of national interest, then the third and fourth layers of national 
interest above—interest among several interests and interest as responsibility towards 
world order—leads to a fifth definition and layer. National interest entails pooling or 
delegating sovereign authority when it is judged necessary to do so. This judgment 
redounds to state leadership. It would seem, therefore, both necessary and possible, from 
the perspective of classical realism, to square national interest with supranational interest 
and square statecraft with cession of sovereignty to supranational organization. Both 
alignments entail facing and overcoming present dilemmas with arguments for paradox-
formation (it is in the national interest to yield sovereignty) and political judgment 
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(sovereignty must be yielded for the sake of national security). And yet, no classical 
realist engages on this path because of the historical limits set by the Cold War.  
In his The Purpose of American Politics, published in 1960, Morgenthau notes, 
for example, that repeated American interest in international self-restraint regarding 
nuclear weaponry between 1946 and 1958 (graduated disarmament, ban on nuclear tests) 
failed because of a mutually reinforcing circle between American and Russian 
nationalisms. He comments: ‘Supranational control of atomic power is incompatible with 
national sovereignty … and [its] authority would exercise for all practical purposes the 
function of a limited world government’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, 172). The Soviet Union 
refused the idea of such cession and the US, while wishing to remove an existential 
threat, sought to maintain national advantage in the struggle for power with the Soviet 
Union. The failure to transcend national interest redounds therefore to the historical 
limitations of the Cold War. In consequence, Morgenthau does not follow the paradox of 
national interest through; nor does he develop further the terms of state prudence in a 
world of global common national interests.9 
I maintain that it is this dilemma and paradox that classical realism bequeaths to 
critical reflection on state leadership in international theory. Within the revival of 
classical realism, there have been three critical attempts to address this dilemma of 
national interest in a nuclear age: the work of Campbell Craig (2003), of Daniel Deudney 
(2007), and of William Scheuerman (2011). I consider them briefly in the next section to 
see what they critically bring to the techno-political un-thought of mid-twentieth century 
realism. 
 
II. The dilemma of classical realism: three arguments in response 
In his intellectual history of the founders of American Realism, Glimmer of a New 
Leviathan, Campbell Craig rehearses how Niebuhr and Morgenthau came to understand 
that the threat of nuclear war undermined the long-term survival of the human species. 
Niebuhr considered more quickly than Morgenthau a nuclear war unwinnable, but offered 
no solution to the nuclear dilemma bar peaceful coexistence between the USA and Soviet 
Union. As we saw above, Morgenthau came to see by the end of the 1950s that nuclear 
war undermined the foundation of Realism (the first layer of national interest: biological 
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survival in international politics) and that, therefore, national interest and sovereignty had 
to cede to a supranational monopoly of nuclear force. Craig argues that, for Morgenthau, 
a world state is only possible if there is a global community underpinning the will to 
institute it, and that this community might emerge specifically through collective fear of 
human self-destruction. For Craig, however, Morgenthau never pursued this line of 
thinking, distracted by the more immediate concerns of the Vietnam War and by the very 
difficulty of the intellectual project he envisaged. He sees no answer in the Waltzian 
solution of managed nuclear proliferation, concluding that, based on statistical 
probability, ‘the continuation of anarchy will sooner or later lead to nuclear war’ (Craig, 
2003: 172). While Craig pinpoints, therefore, the importance of Morgenthau’s normative 
and analytical argument for world government (in specific regard to the monopoly of 
nuclear violence), there is no new theoretical framework in his otherwise excellent 
intellectual history that suggests what states and state leaders might do to transcend the 
nuclear dilemma. 
 In Bounding Power, Daniel Deudney inscribes the nuclear dilemma of classical 
realism into republican security theory.  Given the evolutionary materialist logic of 
violent interdependence, nuclear weapons, with both their global range and global 
destructive capabilities, no longer fit the modern political order of the nation-state. 
Morgenthau’s world-statism (what Deudney calls ‘a nuclear one-worldism’ particular to 
the 1940s-60s) is, however, neither desired nor feasible (Deudney, 2007: 244-64). The 
contemporary nuclear condition is highly complex, interstate conflict is decreasing, and 
no animate extraterritorial threat exists. The control of nuclear arms can, therefore, be 
separated from the statist monopoly over violence and placed in institutional 
arrangements that effectively paralyze military nuclear capability. A key-sharing system 
that aborts unilateral nuclear ignition would provide one illustration of such an 
institutional arrangement of mutual self-restraint by states (262). This ‘republican-type’ 
nuclear union, in distinction to Morgenthau’s supranational monopoly of violence, could 
be governance-light and kept separate from other types of inter-state conflict. Deudney’s 
reconsideration of the nuclear dilemma in Morgenthau is grounded in a technological and 
planetary materialism that does not require supranational political arrangements. The 
implications for statecraft and statesmanship are clear. Whereas statecraft in world-
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statism requires upward cession of sovereignty over the military use of nuclear 
technology towards a world monopoly on nuclear force, the statesperson here pools the 
state’s nuclear sovereignty among other nuclear states, non-nuclear states and an 
international nuclear authority (a revamped IAEA) in order to paralyze its own force. 
Whereas the first required world community to be possible in the first place (at present 
unfeasible), Bounding Power suggests that the pooling of nuclear sovereignty among 
states and institutional actors can redound to republican-minded state responsibility 
alone.10 
 In The Realist Case for Global Reform William Scheuerman argues specifically 
for a progressive realism according to which mid-twentieth century classical realist 
authors like John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schuman and 
Arnold Wolfers all recognized the demise of the nation-state and worked beyond it for 
‘global reform’. Classical realism’s nuclear dilemma becomes one dilemma among 
several, predicated on the malfunction of the nation-state within an increasingly 
interdependent world order requiring new governance structures. While Deudney’s 
solution to Morgenthau’s nuclear dilemma is a loose republican and federal one, 
Scheuerman castigates global anti-statism for radically underestimating the necessity of 
organized coercion for world integration. If the contemporary state is ‘decreasingly well 
suited to basic functions of contemporary governance’ (Scheuerman, 2011: 41), the 
monopoly functions of the state must nevertheless be reinstituted at the global level for a 
democratic political and legal global order to be possible in the first place (138). In sum, 
both security from arbitrary power and redistribution of resources for social justice 
require, at whatever level of human organization, organized coercion. Morgenthau is 
therefore right to argue for world-statism and correctly identified the need for greater 
global social integration to underpin it. Scheuerman’s concern is essentially with political 
economy. It would nevertheless appear that, for him, there will be no solution to the 
nuclear dilemma until, either through catastrophe or coercion, nuclear-armed states give 
up their own monopoly on nuclear force. The world state (not global governance) 
provides, consequently, the right horizon for practically minded reformers, however 
distant its concretization. The nuclear dilemma is not resolved by The Realist Case for 
Global Reform, but rather rehearsed to such intensity and social and economic generality 
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that the normative and analytical argument for world government appears persuasive to 
‘critically minded students of global politics’ (173).11  
 Of these three responses to the classical realist dilemma—that the pursuit of 
national interest is incompatible with modern technology, which requires supranational 
organization—two (Craig and Scheuerman) constitute normative analyses of what is 
necessary to overcome the incompatibility between global imperative and national 
interest. Their work does not offer, however, a concrete notion of progressive statecraft in 
a globalized, but fragmented world. One (Deudney) seeks more feasible solutions in 
global institutional arrangements of a loose republican federal nature. Dividing state 
sovereignty among a plurality of actors and institutions, the argument entails the pooling 
of sovereignty for the very possibility of national security in a nuclear age. It is this last 
argument among contemporary revivals of classical realism that I consider resourceful 
for critically thinking present state leadership.  Before reinforcing and deepening this 
critical reasoning in response to Morgenthau’s dilemma, I turn to a recent 
reconceptualization of state responsibility that comes from the English School. 
 
 
III: Prudence in a globalized, but fragmented world   
I emphasized earlier that Morgenthau’s layered, relational conception of national interest 
led necessarily to understanding the concept of national interest through the prism of 
international responsibility. Since it is in the national interest to share national interests, 
part of the statesperson’s duty, ensuing from a policy of national interest, is to exercise 
responsibility towards other nations and towards the world order within which a world of 
nations operates. Given Deudney’s own productive rehearsal of republican state 
responsibility regarding the nuclear dilemma, it is appropriate at this juncture to further 
the classical realist concept of statecraft and state prudence, ensuing from the concept of 
national interest, by addressing directly the question of state responsibility in a world of 
global threats and challenges. The English School’s thin ‘social’ approach to international 
relations takes the consequences of classical realist logic on power and interest further. 
 The starting-place for English School IR thought are the international values, 
norms, and rules formed through the emergence and interaction of states (Bull, 1977; 
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Bull and Watson, 1984). These common values, norms and rules form ‘international 
society’ of which states are the primary members. Responsibility towards world order 
translates therefore a set of state rights and duties that conform to the basic principles and 
rules of this society. For the generation of Hedley Bull, this set of rights and duties is 
robust (with the global ‘expansion’ of European society), but thin. Interstate rules are 
specific: state sovereignty, rules of war and international law, diplomacy, and trade. In 
his Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States Robert Jackson argues that 
these responsibilities have increased over the last forty years and can be analytically 
distinguished into four categories: national responsibility, international responsibility, 
humanitarian responsibility and responsibility for the global commons (Jackson, 2000: 
170-4). National and international responsibilities cover the same ground as classical 
realism’s layered understanding of national interest and of power/responsibility towards a 
world of nations (the more powerful the state is, the more responsible it becomes 
internationally). Without engaging with the classical realist dilemma above, Jackson 
adds, however, two further responsibilities of statecraft that are readily discernible in the 
world politics of the global present. The statesperson is now also responsible to the 
peoples of other states beyond the immediate formulation of national interests and, to one 
side of the question of historical and causal responsibilities (liability), carries increasingly 
custodial responsibility for the stewardship of both species life and the planet. The state 
has become in this sense the site of a ‘normative pluralist reality’ (179). Couched in 
English School terms, Jackson’s important reflection on responsible statecraft permits 
four major observations regarding my concern with critical reflection on the statesperson 
and prudential conduct.  
First, those who hold offices of state are no longer only responsible to their people 
and to the international order in which they can maintain their interests with other state 
interests. Confronted increasingly with explicitly human and planetary concerns beyond 
the protection and welfare of state citizenship, they must make normative decisions 
between different sets of values that impinge upon the state. For Jackson, contemporary 
international society is far from being a global, cosmopolitan universitas. The rules 
between states are however changing enough for statecraft to be increasingly about hard 
choices not between interest and value, but between different sets of values. The four 
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responsibilities Jackson lists do not carry equal weight; there is incompatibility between 
them given state-led hierarchy. ‘Neither human rights nor environmental ethics can trump 
the responsibilities of national leaders to their own citizens’ (177). That said, as he puts it, 
‘if any one of the norms were acknowledged and followed in a dogmatic way it would 
invite justified criticism nowadays’ (178). State prudence concerns, therefore, 
increasingly weighing which norm has priority in which circumstance and accepting the 
consequences of the decision made. For my purposes, Jackson offers here a critical 
framework for understanding and rehearsing practical judgment (prudence) in a 
globalized, but fragmented world. 
Second, Jackson’s set of distinctions is analytically pitched, but requires a 
sociological framework.12 To move, that is, towards a critical concept of the statesperson, 
it is important to situate the increasing number of responsibilities of the state within a 
historical sociological analysis. We can then understand these responsibilities as the 
political consequence of the state being the densest institutional site of a set of social, 
economic and cultural processes triggered by globalization.13 The pluralization of state 
responsibilities can, in turn, be considered as one effect of material and social 
interdependence. The point is far from trivial. It means that to transcend the system of 
states towards supranational organization undermines political responsibility towards the 
cultural identities of states and sub-states. Inversely, it means that to reduce contemporary 
life to the requirements of various forms of localism ignores political responsibility 
towards the effective and legitimate management of global problems. From this 
historical, sociological perspective it is impossible to provide a critical political theory of 
progressive state practice that brings together all dimensions of responsibility. Hard 
choices between these different responsibilities make up the underbelly of contemporary 
statecraft because of the very nature of what a political community entails (borders).  
Critical reflection on this new historical situation can, however, serve both to understand 
the processes that bring about this situation and bring to bear upon it an appropriate, 
publicly rehearsed sense of political responsibility and judgment.14 
Third, at the same time, this last point has to be addressed more ambitiously. As 
the introduction argued, the present can be defined by the tension between an increasing 
set of global problems and a robust system of developed, developing and failing states. 
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This system is not giving way to a post-sovereign order (Cooper, 2003), as re-emerging 
pluralism confirms. On specific global issues, however, the powers of national 
sovereignty must be negotiated for global action to be effective. Within this set of 
tensions, the state remains the most important site of power, responsibility, and 
transformation. To frame an increasing number of (often incompatible) state 
responsibilities within global processes must be supplemented, therefore, by a critical 
historical analysis of why the state remains the most important political agent to shape 
these processes and, why, therefore, those who assume the duties of state bear the most 
important responsibility for change among all social actors. To renounce this analysis is 
simply un-critical at this historical juncture, in this present. 
Fourth, Jackson’s reflection on state responsibility and prudential statecraft 
nevertheless has its limits, and it is here that we bring back, within the now foregrounded 
context of state responsibility, the classical realist dilemma. For Morgenthau, this 
dilemma redounded to the ‘incompatibility’ between global imperatives and national 
interest. The concept of state responsibility for world order, for humanity and for the 
planet can go some way to resolving this incompatibility: either by explicitly placing the 
state, its functions and its legitimacy in a non-domestic set of global responsibilities 
and/or by showing the tensions that state leaders have increasingly to rehearse and 
negotiate to make responsible decisions in the first place. I have stressed that both moves 
are equally important. What neither move does, however, is align global imperatives with 
national interest and/or national responsibility to one’s people as such. Jackson’s English 
School approach emphasizes the changing set of values, norms and rules that define the 
changing regime of state sovereignty and state responsibility in a globalizing world. His 
approach does not argue however that, on specific issues, national and global interests 
and responsibilities must be squared. 
Jackson remarks that his own approach is ‘conservative’ (Jackson, 2000: 179) in 
that it stands with the state and international society, expands the state’s responsibilities 
towards humanity and the world, but emphasizes hard choices between different norms. I 
would disagree with this conservative label given the broad strokes of a historical 
sociological analysis above: to assume the pluralization of state responsibilities as the 
contemporary underbelly of statecraft is already a progressive notion. However, I would 
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crucially add that if, in particular circumstances and on specific problems, global and 
national interests can be squared, then transformative political leadership from out of the 
state is possible. In this sense, state prudence is not only about tolerance, reciprocity, 
consequential analysis, responsibility, and hard choices. It is also about taking risks to 
redefine the national interest globally. To cut through the diremption between globalism 
and nationalisms, one critical task is for statepersons to affirm and embody how global 
and national interests/responsibilities converge.  
 
 
IV: Lining up the global and the national: the contemporary risk of 
state leadership 
Lining up global and national interests and responsibilities is not a new challenge for the 
state and state leadership. The risks involved have been entertained before and 
understood within great power and hegemonic accounts of statecraft. Indeed great 
statecraft is often understood in terms of this alignment. Great Britain’s leadership on the 
abolition of the slave trade, the US’s Marshall Plan for Europe and the US’s exit from the 
Breton Woods arrangement in 1972 constitute three examples of where hegemonic 
powers have either assumed or refused the risk of aligning national interest with global 
concerns, and where the state leaders concerned were judged accordingly. The risk is one 
of modernity in the sense that it is a risk of leadership (to line up the global and the 
national) that enters the historical stage only once the earth and its human populations are 
materially and morally integrated into bounded territory. What is new today is that this 
alignment has become immanent to national policy-making. Transborder problems 
interfere with national integrity, national identity, and national ambition. This 
phenomenon has been accepted, at the level of national interest and national security, 
with new security problematics like ‘climate change security’ and ‘cybersecurity’. 
Despite this recent alignment, it remains nevertheless difficult to narrate the convergence 
between the national and global and to theorize it in explicitly political terms. The Stern 
review on climate change is an instructive example of this difficulty. 
 In 2006, UK Prime Minister Blair’s climate change adviser, Nicholas Stern, 
argued that climate change mitigation and adaptation required preventive action now to 
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lessen the economic costs later (Stern, 2010). The argument resonated with policy-
makers, both nationally and internationally, because the argument for action against 
climate change was made in terms of economic rationalism. The costs of reorganizing the 
present economy towards sustainable modes of production and consumption were less 
than the future economic costs of not doing so. Although there has been important 
disagreement concerning Stern’s chosen discount rate for future generations (Helm 2012; 
Northcott, 2014), there has been much less disagreement with the political effectiveness 
of an economic argument on climate change mitigation and adaptation as such. Since the 
material dimension of national interest is calculated in cost/benefit terms, economic 
utilitarian language seemed the most appropriate political language to marry national and 
global concerns. This is partially true. The UK has a cross-party agreement to seek an 
80% reduction on C02 emissions by 2050 (on a 1990 baseline) in order to help the world 
as a whole achieve a temperature increase of less than 2°C by 2100. The UK seeks 
through nationally determined commitments global political leadership on climate change 
(peer competition to foster international cooperation). To one side of whether these 
arguments actually add up (Hoffmann, 2013), there remains a major problem of political 
narrative. Climate change cannot be made an economic problem alone if the marriage 
between the national and the global is to capture political imagination. A specifically 
political approach is needed in order to animate the risk of state leadership on a global 
action issue. To line up the national and the global, at least four sets of argument are, I 
suggest, needed.15 
 First, regarding the negative effects of a trans-border event, a general, public 
argument needs to be made that it is the responsibility of the office-holders of the state to 
manage these effects in the name of the welfare of its citizens. For the moment this 
argument is publicly rehearsed regarding terrorism, migration flows, and health 
pandemics. Very little is, however, rehearsed publicly within a general problematic of 
trans-border threats as such. This problematic should include global finance, climate 
change and nuclear proliferation. The point is that state leaders should hold themselves 
responsible—and, therefore, be held accountable by their citizenry—for the effects of 
these phenomena because they affect the welfare of their citizens. Jackson’s distinctions 
consider neither this notion of responsibility nor the risk of leadership that accompanies 
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it. An argument concerning needs is not however enough to stimulate political 
imagination, except in the case of immediate existential threat. 
 Second, events of a global nature that affect national citizenry and that necessitate 
national leadership and international collective action require a political language that 
goes to the roots of political identity: citizenship. The key concept here is that of freedom 
(or, actively put, emancipation). As republican thinkers have recently begun to articulate, 
a marriage between the national and the global (in my terms) can be forged politically 
through an expansion of a more republican than liberal understanding of freedom. 
Returning to the Roman idea of liber, the freeman, Philip Pettit argues for example, that 
either an individual and/or a collective is free as long as its ability to choose what it 
wishes is not only not hindered by another agent (the liberal idea of freedom) but is 
independent of the volition of another agent tout court (Pettit, 2007, 2014). Freedom 
requires, therefore, independence from both existent and structural domination: what he 
calls ‘freedom as non-domination’. Since domestic freedom requires laws and institutions 
to restrain internal domination threats, the state constitutes, for the civic republican, the 
condition of freedom. If, accordingly, events or agents external to the state prevent the 
state from fulfilling its modern duties, office-holders of the state are, in principle, bound 
to try and satisfy its citizens by ridding them of this domination. If this requires, as in the 
case of all global trans-border problems, interstate cooperation and/or supranational 
authority, the state leader is the one who pools national sovereignty and/or cedes it where 
necessary (as in the case of a monopoly of nuclear force) to guarantee the freedom of his 
or her citizens. At this stage of the argument, the critical point is not whether this risk of 
statehood is empirically feasible (it happens presently at the functionalist level of ‘low 
political’ issues alone). Rather, the critical point is whether an effective normative 
argument for progressive national state leadership is possible that can foster appropriate 
kinds of political imagination and risk.  
 Third, the first two arguments concern global problems, the state and its own 
citizens. The question of responsibility towards non-citizens comes up, however, in their 
very exposition. In terms of the first argument, meeting the needs of non-citizens helps 
meet the needs of one’s own. Here, in comparison with Robert Jackson’s approach, there 
is no ‘incompatibility’, no ‘hard choice’ between national and humanitarian 
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responsibility. One hears this argument regarding present migration flows to the 
European continent. Development of sub-Saharan Africa is not only a moral imperative 
in the name of basic human interests; it is a political imperative of national security. The 
securitization of development concerns should be handled prudently by the state since the 
argument can quickly revert into isolationism and exclusionism when national wealth is 
spent. That said, the argument is not false and provides, more importantly, a baseline for 
a more reflective, republican-type argument. As Pettit has argued, if events or agents are 
preventing citizens of other states from enjoying their freedom, the republican obligation 
is to assist them if this is their expressed wish or to assist the foreign state in such a way 
that it can assume its own duty to its citizens (Pettit, 2014: 177).16 
 Fourth, if this kind of assistance requires mediating institutions at international 
and supranational levels, then, the supranational organization no longer has to be 
considered as ‘incompatible’ with national interest. The supranational and national work, 
in principle, together in order to secure and sustain more local freedoms. The 
supranational authority (for example, a coordinating agency of technological transfers 
that has nevertheless sovereign decision over aid-destination) serves as a supplement to 
national freedom, not a new form of domination over it. It is important to show how this 
supplemental logic might reorganize—in terms of political imagination—Morgenthau’s 
nuclear dilemma and paradox. For Morgenthau, the pursuit of national interest is 
incompatible with modern nuclear technology, which requires supranational organization. 
The paradox for modern state leadership is to yield national interest to supranational 
authority in the name of global national interests. Within my framework of republican 
supplementary logic, the pursuit of national interest is made compatible with modern 
technology through supranational authority. There is little difference between the two 
logics, except that the first retains the paradox while the second assumes it within a 
republican (federal) logic of mutual self-restraint. It is here that my own analysis would 
rejoin Deudney’s critique of Morgenthau’s world-statism. 
 The proof of these largely theoretical arguments is, of course, in the pudding: the 
concrete forms of statecraft that they help to encourage. Since statecraft is not a science, 
and since prudence is a practical skill, these arguments serve only to frame political 
imagination at a moment when the gap between the national and the global has to be 
Beardsworth	 21	
bridged from the nation upwards. Morgenthau stood back from the nuclear dilemma 
given American and Soviet nationalism. The Vietnam War then distracted his intellectual 
attention. He saw little way to bridge the national and the supranational given their 
incompatibility of interests and despaired of his generation’s lack of political 
imagination. Both using a responsibilities argument and seeking to marry the global and 
the national through republican-type arguments, I am suggesting: 1) that the abyss 
Morgenthau despaired of can be framed more positively, even regarding military power; 
and 2) that the national/global framework of state leadership can help to provide, at this 
historical moment, something like a republican, federal agenda for future political 
solutions to global threats and challenges. So what critical concept of the statesperson 
emerges from this work? I will use the simple methodology of hypothetical profile-traits 
to answer.17 
 
Part V: Towards a critical concept of the statesperson 
The statesperson upholds first the ‘common good’ of the state by not allowing any one 
particular interest to dominate it internally. Political philosophy and political theory have 
always been clear, from Plato and Aristotle onwards, that statecraft requires such 
balancing of interests within the state so that it remains a polity for all its citizens. Good 
statespersons are those who achieve that balance. 
Classical realism’s understanding of the national interest as a guide to a state’s 
foreign policy within a world of states extends this craft to the international realm. A 
statesperson upholds, second, the national interest of the state in relation to the national 
interests of other states: this requires prudential judgment, particularly in order to 
safeguard the national interest in the plural environment of world politics. Good 
statespersons are those who satisfy, in one, the national interest and uphold world order. 
The prudence of statecraft has become all the more complex as world politics has 
turned, on an array of existential and moral issues, into global politics. With the material 
and ideological pressures of globalization, the statesperson has, third, to guide state 
action through a series of conflicting if not incompatible normative demands. These 
demands can imply divergent state responsibilities (Jackson suggested six) between the 
needs of domestic employment and the needs of the international trade regime and/or 
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between the physical and/or social welfare of one’s own people and assistance to those in 
need beyond the state. Assuming the responsibility of these responsibilities and of the 
hoices between them defines the statesperson and the quality of their state leadership. A 
good statesperson in a globalized but fragmented world both holds the state together as a 
free state and fulfills humanitarian and global responsibilities beyond its borders. 
In a world of interdependence among states and their peoples, some of these state 
responsibilities are therefore not incompatible when correctly conceived and aligned.  It 
is in the overall national interest to protect the planet upon which states are housed and 
therefore a responsibility of statecraft to construct political responses to planetary 
degradation at the appropriate level. The contemporary statesperson is, fourth, one who 
shows and rehearses the marriages between the national common good and the global 
common good. He or she takes, accordingly, the risk to lead the state into poorly known 
territory of pooling and/or ceding sovereignty to international and supranational political 
arrangements in the very name of national sovereignty. The good statesperson is the 
leader who transforms global interest into national interest and national interest into 
global interest without incurring new forms of domination. 
These four traits make up a critical concept of the statesperson: they provide a 
portfolio of state responsibilities that make sense of the contemporary state condition and 
provide normative and progressive guidance for it. Is this concept uncritically calling for 
a messiah? No. It is what a critical concept of the statesperson requires because it is 
addressing the nature of domestic, foreign and global policy in a long-term present: a 
globalized world of states. Progressive political leadership will embody these traits in one 
form or another in the coming years, just as regressive leadership refuses them. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that a fruitful meeting-place between classical realism and critical 
theory—under the general rubric of modernity, crisis and humanity—is to be found in our 
global present and in political responses to it. Given the gap between global problems and 
solutions to them, which characterizes this present, the latter requires progressive state 
action to forge international cooperation between states and the pooling and cession of 
national sovereignty where governance imperatives require. Without state leadership, 
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both the global efficacy and national legitimacy of these imperatives are in doubt. State 
leadership redounds to the office-holders of the state. They, among all international 
actors, have the power to assume the responsibility of leadership and help effect global 
political transformation.  The paper has argued, accordingly, for a new critical conception 
of the statesperson: one able to embody often-conflicting duties in a globalized world; 
one able to assume in the very name of national sovereignty what regularly appear as 
duties conflicting with the national interest. I conclude this paper with the most obvious 
retort to my intellectual move in order to deepen the introduction’s rehearsal of my 
understanding of the ‘critical’. 
 Everything that this article has argued, the critical theorist might say, explores a 
set of priorities and range of possibilities within the state system. It is within this system 
that the nuclear dilemma insists as our present in the first place, and it is only within this 
system that the language and the problematic of ‘state prudence’ and ‘state responsibility’ 
have pertinence to begin with. As a result, these languages of prudence and responsibility 
perpetuate a system that needs to be transformed as such for critical thought and action 
to be possible. Perpetuating the system, whatever their intentions (that is, to one side of 
power-drives), state leaders cannot be critical. The paper’s perspective throughout this 
argument therefore loses critical thought in the very gesture with which it attempts to 
regain it for the present. In doing so, it returns the present to the repetition of existing 
power structures and betrays the final purpose of critical theory: emancipation. It is 
responsible, rather, not to engage with state power and responsibility. 
 This retort is elegant but flawed: answering it clarifies my rehearsal of the term 
‘critical’ in the introduction and my use of it throughout this article. 
 First, if critical thought entails historical theorizing, then it cannot itself stand 
outside of time. The object of critique does not only change through history; the notion of 
critique must change as well. I said in the introduction that the family traits of critique 
converge in its transformative relation to the present. As for the early Frankfurt School, 
this relation has deep roots in an amalgamation of Kantian critique and Marxian critical 
political economy. As has been well researched over the last half-century, these 
modalities of critique no longer stand up in the same way that they could in earlier 
modernity. Kant’s critique of the limits of reason presupposes the fact of reason in the 
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first place: an assumption that allows him to short-circuit history and posit liberal 
teleology. Marx, in contrast, can only posit the object of capital and its immanent 
contradictions based on a ‘supply-side’ understanding of value (labour value). Without 
this assumption, the ‘contradictions’ of capitalism revert to tensions, and alternatives to 
it—as the 2007/8 financial crisis showed again—can be quickly marginalized. This is not 
to say that the critical gestures delimiting illusions of thought or de-reifying what appears 
natural or social givens do not remain important critical enterprises (see Linklater, 1998). 
My point is, rather, that to stand outside the system is not presently possible and that one 
still needs to think through the political consequences of this historical and theoretical 
point. 
 To argue that a gesture is only politically critical if it is made outside the system 
is, for the same reason, untenable. French critical thought from the 1980s onwards—
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Jean-Francois Lyotard, following 
in part the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno—punctured effectively the illusion of 
thinking in extra-systemic and/or holistic terms. They lost, however, in so doing, 
comprehensive normative vision and, correlatively, a sense of political specificity: the 
absolute need to draw a line in the sand to counter-effect other forces in the political field 
(Beardsworth, 2011: 224-6). It is critical today—in both senses of the term: urgent and 
reflective—to think and implement differently the sense of what is critical and not to 
oppose it to those who hold power.18 Unable today to stand outside the system, critique 
must also work within it and transform its own terms of self-understanding.  
 Second, this means, in the context of political transformation in a changing 
system of states, looking not only to global civil society, but also to the state to be an 
agent of change. 
 Third, looking directly to the state to address effective change redounds also to 
the fact that the state constitutes the most intense and conflicting site of transformation at 
this historical juncture. Too much critical thought has circumvented the state although it 
is within the changing parameters of the state that effective leverage on trans-border 
problems is possible. Such circumvention vacates the force field of politics to 
contemporary nationalisms. 
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 Fourth, and finally, my critical theorist might still retort that critical theory seeks 
deeper terms of transformation when addressing the present; and that, to use the language 
of Thomas Kuhn and Robert Cox, forsaking new paradigms of thought returns one to 
‘problem-solving’ reflection within the present paradigm (Cox, 1996: 207-8). I have 
effectively questioned this distinction in point one above. It is, however, worth noting 
further that the problem with this critical standpoint is less that it does not offer feasible 
alternatives to the present all the while critiquing it (see Brown, 2012) than it does not 
critically negotiate with the agencies of power that presently determine the direction of 
the future. As a result, it always runs the risk of standing powerless before this future (as 
was the case after 9/11, after 2007/8 and with regard to the domestic, European and 
global consequences of ‘Brexit’). With regard to the present’s transformation, this 
position is neither morally nor politically responsible. Re-drawing lines of reflection in 
international theory between mid-twentieth century classical realism and critical theory 
not only fosters critical change in our understanding of political agency with regard to the 
present and its transformation. It invites us to reconsider what a progressive state and a 
progressive statesperson mean in a globalized, fragmented world. As a result more 
effective alliances between states, global civil society, and international organizations can 
be built regarding this present, and concrete stepping-stones can be forged towards the 
idea of a just, differentiated global order.   
 
Notes 																																																								
1 The term ‘statesman’ is often replaced by the term ‘statesperson’ and/or ‘state leader’ in 
order that gender neutrality is guaranteed. I follow this usage, also replacing the generic 
concept of ‘statesmanship’ by either ‘statecraft ‘or ‘state leadership’. Throughout this 
paper the discipline of International Relations is abbreviated IR. 
2 For strong statements on critical theory and IR, see Ashley (1984); Ashley and Walker 
(1990); Beardsworth (2007); Booth (2007); Habermas (2006); Held (1995); Der Derian 
(1994); Linklater (1990, 1998, 2007); Price and Reus-Smit (1998); Walker (1992, 2010); 
Wyn-Jones (2001, 2005). For meta-theoretical considerations of mid-twentieth century 
classical realism, see Bain (2000); Behr and Roesch (2012); Guilhot (2011); Lebow 
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(2001); Molloy (2006); Scheuerman (2009, 2011); Schou Tjalve (2008); Williams 
(2005). 
3 To be clear: these ‘margins’ have been important in re-organizing the ‘center’ of politics 
on ethnic and gender fronts. They have been unable, however, to offer an effective 
alternative to domestic and international liberalism.  
4 Following then UN General Secretary Kofi Annan’s call in 2003 for a report on 
contemporary challenges to the international community and on UN policy responses to 
them. 
5 Much global governance procedure in terms of international cooperation is now framed 
by game theory (see particularly Barrett 2003; Sandler, 1997, 2004).  Despite the insights 
it brings to international agreement, the rationalist framework of game theory is 
politically thin.  
6 This approach could be aligned with Michael Williams’ concept of ‘willful realism’ and 
his constructivist, reflective reformulation of Weber’s ethics of responsibility (Williams, 
2005: 169-210). Compare also Robert Jackson’s conception of the ‘situational ethics of 
statecraft’ (Jackson, 2000, 2004), to which I turn later. 
7 Classical realism is state-minded, not state-focused. When the major site of executive 
decision-making in world affairs changes, classical realist understandings of political 
morality will change.  
8 Nationalism, for Morgenthau, is an exclusive principle of political order: see 
‘Nationalism’ (Morgenthau, 1962). 
9 One of Morgenthau’s final words on this matter is found in the essay on ‘Nationalism’. 
With reference to nuclear nationalism, he wrote: ‘Political imagination is the key word. If 
the West cannot think of something better than nationalism, it may well lose the 
opportunity to think at all’ (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 194). 
10 The point is first formulated by James Speer (Speer, 1968). 
11 Compare here the work of Luis Cabrera (2004, 2005, 2010). 
12 Despite Jackson’s engagement with history, the genealogy of state responsibility is 
only addressed within the terms of the evolution of interstate action. 
Beardsworth	 27	
																																																																																																																																																																					
13 In comparison, IGOs and NGOs are relatively thin sites of global social processes: 
hence why their responsibilities are less. This may make them more functional, but, by 
the same token, it makes them less politically agential. 
14 The seminal work of Andrew Linklater has been addressing the first of these issues for 
the last decade (Linklater 2007, 2010, 2011, forthcoming). This paper constitutes one 
attempt to address the second. 
15 For a more detailed republican argument on this alignment, see Beardsworth 2015. 
16 Pettit places this logic under the heading of ‘globalized sovereignty’ (185-6).  
17 See Foley (2014) for a comprehensive analysis of contemporary methodologies in 
political leadership studies. 
18 The referendum for ‘Brexit’ is testimony to this point. 
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